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Five Banks Are Not a System
A concentrated banking system is a fragile one. Here is why that matters to anyone building resilience.
There is an argument, well outside the textbook mainstream, that where credit is created and who it reaches explains more about a country’s prosperity than any interest-rate decision. You don’t have to accept all of it to take the useful part seriously, or to see what it implies for how thoughtful families hold their capital.
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Gun Bay Global AdvisorySeptember 29, 2026 · 7 min read
Start with a question that bothers a lot of sensible people. We have the best technology we have ever had and the most educated workforce in history, yet across much of the developed world growth is thin, public services strain, and ordinary households feel like they are running to stand still. Is something simply broken, or is the machinery working exactly as designed for the people who built it?
One of the more provocative answers comes from the economist Richard Werner, whose work sits well outside the mainstream but rests on a piece of plumbing that is now hard to dispute. We think the sober core of his argument is worth understanding, precisely because it changes how you read almost every macro headline you see.
Where money actually comes from
The textbook picture of a bank is a middleman: it gathers deposits from savers and lends them out to borrowers. Under that view, a bank can only lend what it has first collected. It turns out this is not how a bank works. When a bank makes a loan, it does not move existing money from a vault or another account. It creates a new deposit in the borrower’s account, expanding the money supply in the act of lending. The Bank of England said as much in its own 2014 bulletin, and Werner’s empirical test that year, following a single loan through a bank’s books, put the question to rest.
If that is true, one consequence follows immediately: the quantity and, above all, the direction of new credit is one of the most powerful forces in an economy. It is not a neutral pipe. It is the tap.
Not all credit is the same
Werner’s more useful contribution is to insist that where new credit goes determines what it does. He splits it three ways, and the distinction is genuinely clarifying:
Credit for productionLoans to firms that build, make and hire. This adds to output as it adds to the money supply, so it tends to grow the economy without stoking inflation.
Credit for consumptionLoans that fund spending on existing goods. More money chasing the same output. This is the classic recipe for consumer-price inflation.
Credit for assetsLoans to buy existing property and financial assets. This inflates asset prices, feeds booms, and sets up the busts. It is the credit behind most banking crises.
Read the last two decades through that lens and a lot resolves. When the bulk of new lending flows into housing and financial assets rather than productive businesses, you get exactly what many economies have gotten: asset prices detached from wages, fragile balance sheets, and a cycle of boom and bust, with too little of the productive investment that actually raises living standards.
The part that reaches the middle class
Here is where the structure of the banking system starts to matter more than any policy speech. There is a simple, well-observed rule: big banks do big deals with big customers. They have to. A bank with a balance sheet measured in the trillions cannot profitably underwrite a £40,000 loan to the machine shop down the road; the fixed cost of the decision is the same whether the loan is small or enormous, so it chases the enormous one, or lends to a private-equity fund that will.
Small and medium-sized firms are not a rounding error. They employ roughly two-thirds of the private-sector workforce in most advanced economies. They are, in a real sense, the middle class. When a banking system consolidates down to a handful of giant institutions, the firms that most need patient, local, relationship-based credit are the ones who can no longer get it, and a country’s productivity quietly stalls. Britain has diagnosed this same problem, under the same name, since a parliamentary report in 1918. Very little has changed.
The contrast that proves the point is Germany, at least in its stronger decades. Alongside its large banks, Germany kept a dense network of small local savings and cooperative banks that lend only within their own region, know their borrowers by name, and can approve a loan for a new piece of equipment in days. That local credit is what let the Mittelstand — the thousands of specialist small manufacturers — adopt new technology as it arrived. It is not romance. It is plumbing that reaches the whole house.
Interest rates are the decoy
If credit is the real lever, then the tool everyone watches — the central-bank interest rate — is largely a distraction. Werner’s data point is uncomfortable for the textbook: over the long run, rates tend to follow growth rather than lead it, and they move with it, not against it. Strong economies run higher rates; weak ones run lower. That is the opposite of the story we are usually told. Whether or not you accept the strong version of his claim, it is a healthy corrective to the habit of treating the next rate decision as the only number that matters.
What this has to do with us
We write about macro plumbing for one reason: it tells you where the fragilities are. And the through-line of this one is a theme we return to often. Centralization concentrates both power and risk. A financial system routed through a few enormous institutions is efficient in calm weather and brittle in a storm, because when a handful of nodes carry everything, a problem at any one of them is everyone’s problem.
The individual response to a fragile, centralized system is not panic. It is the same discipline we apply to everything: don’t let all of your resilience depend on a single institution, a single currency, a single jurisdiction, or a single kind of asset. Hold some of your worth in things that do not live or die by the health of one banking system, real assets among them. Keep more than one harbour. This is why we invest the way we advise, and hold what we recommend — the whole point of skin in the game is that we sit inside the same weather you do.
A system with one pipe is efficient until the day it isn’t. Resilience is having somewhere else for the water to go.
None of this requires believing in hidden hands or grand design. The plainer reading is enough: incentives shaped the system we have, that system rewards scale, scale starves the productive middle, and concentration trades away resilience for efficiency. Understanding that is not cause for despair. It is simply a good reason to build your own affairs the other way, distributed, provisioned, and pointed at more than one exit.
A question worth sitting with
So it is worth turning the question inward, quietly and without alarm. How many pipes do you have for your wealth to flow where you need it, when you need it? Is it one bank, in one country, inside one financial system? And if that single pipe were cut off — frozen, restricted, revalued, or simply closed for reasons that had nothing to do with you — what would actually happen next? Where would the water go?
Most people have never had cause to ask, because the pipe has always worked. Helping clients build an answer to that question — more than one pipe, laid before the weather turns — is much of what we do. We don’t raise it to move you to act today. We raise it as a call for deeper thought, the kind that is far easier to have in calm water than in a storm.
This article is for general information only and reflects the author’s views and a summary of a heterodox economic argument. It is not economic, investment, legal or tax advice, and it is not an offer or solicitation of any product or security. Figures are presented as commonly reported and have not been independently verified. Seek qualified professional advice before acting.